Valparaiso University Law Review
Volume 27
Number 3 Summer 1993

Summer 1993

Ordinary Sacraments
Emily Fowler Hartigan

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Emily Fowler Hartigan, Ordinary Sacraments, 27 Val. U. L. Rev. 593 (1993).
Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol27/iss3/3

This Commentary is brought to you for free and open
access by the Valparaiso University Law School at
ValpoScholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Valparaiso University Law Review by an authorized
administrator of ValpoScholar. For more information,
please contact a ValpoScholar staff member at
scholar@valpo.edu.

pp.593-598

Hartigan: Ordinary Sacraments

ORDINARY SACRAMENTS
EMILY FOWLER HARTIGAN*

Twenty-seven years ago, when I was a junior at Swarthmore College in the
famous Sixties, one of my good friends explained to me with considerable
passion what she knew I had never heard: the nature of Social Darwinism. She
said she had not understood it initially, but it was one of the things she learned
from her friend Richard Parker, then a year ahead of us. He had conveyed the
deep irony of a system of thought that seemed "progressive," but that more
fundamentally upheld a system of hierarchy as evolutionarily "natural" and thus
justified. Just as the survival of the fittest was supposed to be genetic good
news, the societal shakeout that left the poor at the bottom was all part of the
selection by nature of those who were "best." This was circular reasoning of
the most insidious kind, Richard had taught her.
I had come from two very conservative parents, from the South, from a
huge public school, and from a legacy of considerable cultural traditionalism.
Richard Parker was part of a class that produced a Weather underground
bomber, Nietzsche and Shakespeare scholars of the "first order," and a richness
of protest activity that my background allowed me to register but not integrate.
Since that time, I have moved further and further into much of what Swarthmore
began to teach me, intellectually, emotionally, and spiritually. So I sit here at
Pendle Hill, the Quaker Study Center that was a presence full of "weighty
Friends" when we were in college next door to it, and I am met with the
memories and the recognition of Parker's passion for social justice that I had
heard through a friend lightly all those years ago.
I am delighted to encounter that energy (to use his word) again. Richard
Parker is a true force in constitutional thought, and his Populist commitment
finds fertile landscape here.' I have written of the most notable historical (to
those of us who have ever lived in Nebraska) instance of that Populism,
celebrating William Jennings Bryan and the closest the Populists ever came to
a national office, as well as suggesting that their most profound achievement was
to name into being the "retained right" of the people for the initiative.' I think
I share fundamentally (dare I use such a word) in Parker's love of the Populist

* Adjunct Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Resident, Pendle Hill Quaker
Center for Study and Contemplation. This is in gratitude and hope, for David Langley.
1. Richard D. Parker, "Here, The People Rule": A ConstitutionalPopulistManifesto, 27 VAL.
U. L. REV. 531 (1993).
2. E. Fowler Hartigan, Derridoz Law Written in Our Hean/Land: "The Powers Retained by
the People," 67 TULANE L. REV. 1133 (1993).
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current of American political energy. And so it is with gratitude that I add to
his account what I consider to be the missing "and" in a both/and about
Populism. 3 One face of that "something further" is the role of reflection in
human affairs; another face of the same phenomenon, for me, is the role of that
intellectualist phobia Parker seems to recapitulate, the fear of God.
For Parker never deals with the fact most apparent from Bryan's life: "the
people" believe in God. They did at the time of the Scopes4 trial, and they do
now. Despite the intellectualist drive to separate God from politics, most
Americans do not maintain such a wall. The compliance studies I recall from
the early school prayer decisions showed that something existed in what Parker
characterized as "elitist" 5 Court's decisions that the people found unacceptable,
indigestible. Like Hendrik Hartog's pigkeepers in New York City, 6 who defied
the law for decades and thus created a de facto situation of recognized order
despite law-on-the-books, teachers still put Bibles on their desks, and struggle
(so a great many have told me, and commentators fear) to manifest their
primary fidelity to their religious faiths. Ironically, the more the Court drives
this faithfulness to witness underground, the less plural this belief is likely to
be-the more dominant Christian. Either way, under a stultifying separationist
doctrine or in a more open pluralism, the people are God-fearing in an
increasingly fractured and fascinating way-they are recognizably, fundamentally
religious.
There is good evidence-just look at the drug store or airport book
stand-that the people are becoming downright mystical. Despite all the panic
at "New Age" religion, consumers are buying what they think will help them
reclaim their sense of spirit. Thus, to do what you love and let the money
follow, recognizable as "Seek ye first the reign of God. . .and the rest in its
own time will follow," 7 begins to seep into greed economics. The Tao of
Physics and magical, mystical bears and Monks and Mystics tell the public that
they have access to a state of consciousness that can work to undermine the
structures of thought Parker attacks. So I want to suggest to him something
about the story he uses to come back to the people, to the ordinary, to the nonprivileged.

3. For an example of the feminist reasoning of "both/and," see generally Elizabeth Ann
Bartlett, Beyond Either/Or: Justice and Care in the Ethics ofAlbert Cantits, in EXPLORATIONS IN
FEMINIST ETHICS: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Eve Browning Cole & Susan Coultrap-McQuin, eds.,

1992). Under traditional Aristotelian thinking, to say "both A and not A" is a false statement.
Under the feminist notion, we live and speak in flux, and speaking the fullness of the truth requires
speaking in apparent contradictions (both/and).
4. Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363 (Tenn. 1927).
5. Parker, supra note 1, at 577 n.84.
6. Hendrik Hartog, Pigs and Positivism, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 899.
7. See generally Matthew 6:33.
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When I read the story of Mario and the Magician,8 waiting for a draft of
Parker's talk to arrive, I simply read it differently than he did, first time around.
I had not read much of Mann since reading The Magic Mountait? nearly twenty
years ago, but I had a strong memory of the intense mysticism of snow and
disease in the realm of Mynheer Peeperkorn and his companions. Thus, I read
the relatioiship of the magician to the people as more multidimensional than
Parker does. I read it from a place in which the inversions of deconstruction
happen without elitist intellectual complexities, because the mundane is sacred,
and the ordinary is the miraculous. I read with a sense that the parents were
horrified they had not protected their children from the spectacle, but that the
children, with their fascination, were the best hope for a vantage point that
would redeem the tragedy, in time.
However, even more centrally, I read with an ear to Cipolla's statements
about his relationship with the audience. Mann wrote him as a profoundly
sinister figure, yet he claimed an uncanny relation of self-giving. Because of
my traditions of the liberation spirituality of newness, the creation-centered
valuing of the shadow side of reality for its wholeness, and the "necessity" of
sin lauded from St. Paul to Juliana of Norwich, I was attending to the story
from both vantages. Cipolla was also God's creature; God created the serpent
and put it in the garden. And so without thought beyond the text, I read the
final passages about Mario's betrayal of his beloved's reality, and took to heart
the narrator's strange openness to Cipolla: as the audience's laughter rang out,
Cipolla himself was enfolded in the "undertone of compassion for the poor,
bewildered, victimized creature."' 0
That compassion came from
"Poveretto,"" from the poverty named by Cipolla and claimed by Cipolla for
himself. The power of poverty is the core of the Christian story, the center of
Buddhist thought, the hasidic holiness of rabbinic Judaism. Thus when Mario
hurls himself around and two explosions ring out, and Cipolla bounds from his
seat and then collapses, I simply read it as Mario's suicide and its destruction
of Cipolla. I took seriously the interconnectedness that Cipolla claimed. I have
gone back and re-read the end several times. I agree that the most plausible
reading is that Mario needed to be disarmed because he was still alive. Yet I
am unable to forget how the story went when I first read it, because I am so
cognizant of the inversions history plays on us, and how hero and villain are so
often reversed and returned and turned again. And I cannot help but wonder if

8. THOMAS MANN, Mario and the Magician, in DEATH IN VENICE AND SEVEN OTHER STORIES
133 (H.T. Lowe-Porter, trans., Vintage International 1989) (Mario and the Magician was originally
published in German in 1929) [hereinafter Mario].
9. THOMAS MANN, THE MAGIC MOUNTAIN (H.T. Lowe-Porter, trans., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.
1930).
10. Mario, supra note 8, at 177.
11. Id. at 167, 177.
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such a brilliant writer as'Mann did not know that he had written the climax with
radical ambiguity, so that the reader could only "decide" who had killed whom,
and how, after the fact. Cipolla "killed" or Mario would not have, and Cipolla
died, either way or both, in poverty.
There are things which follow from this reading for me. One is to remind
Parker that there is no single standard of the Good. The people make mistakes,
just as any individual does. Somehow we know that we want to be able to make
that judgment, and so there is more to politics than ordinary political energy in
its simple form. Perhaps in its "simplicity after complexity," to paraphrase
Emerson's idea, 2 the people are most likely to be right, but it is not just
elitism which causes us to look back, to reflect. It is the ordinary process of
learning.
Parker touches on the way such learning and ordinary goodness take place
when he refers to the concern that judges' work is "infected by 'personal values'
or 'political commitments.'"' 3 He argues against seeing those personal
groundings as illicit. He also notes the way in which the Constitution has
become an object inspiring even faith, evoking pontification and idolatry. The
Constitution, he suggests, has become a fetish of belief.' 4 What he does not
do, however, is to suggest how the need for connection that he says we have is
related to the oldest form of community connection, religion (which itself mean
re-ligare, to re-connect). He advocates being in touch with what is ordinary in
oneself, but evades the most ordinary core of human energy, religious faith. He
does not really deal with the sense of magic that led so many to gather to see
Cipolla, or our growing sense that much of human life is not susceptible to
capture in words or science or logic or even law.
By and large, Parker's rendition seems to me to loosen up the restrictions
we put on ourselves as "reasonable"' 5 persons suspicious of political passion,
and I applaud that "liberation" 6 move. I would set boundaries, however; he
thinks all issues ought to be open to the political process of majority rule, and
I reply that neither slavery nor the restriction of suffrage can be open. He might
well agree, as there are things necessary to the process itself, such as fair
elections, even in his strongly majoritarian vision.

12. RALPH W. EMERSON, The Over-Soul & Intellect, in ESSAYS AND LECTURES 383, 415
(Library of America 1983).
13. Parker, supra note 1, at 561.
14. Id. at564-65 & n.42.
15. Id. at555, 572.
16. Id. at540-41, 551 (quoting THOMAS MANN, Marioand the Magician, in DEATH INVENICE
AND SEVEN OTHER STORIES (H.T. Lowe-Porter, trans., Vintage International 1989) at 178).
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Parker also does something wonderfully paradoxical in its value; he falls
into his own trap, and yet his overall message is so strongly turned toward
freeing us from disdain for the ordinary, that his "fall" illustrates the way in
which such ordinary human mixedness is of inordinate value. After analyzing
constitutional rhetoric as disdainful of the non-educated, non-elite, he addresses
"your Anti-Populist instincts" 7 which he says we all have. He then tells us
to hesitate: "Consider the banality of what you were about to say. Consider the
overheated hyperbole."' He has brought us full circle. The "banality of evil"
made famous by Hannah Arendt 9 has caught the people-lover, and he has
called a very ordinary response banal and overheated. This sounds disdainful
and even elitist to me. It also sounds like something I do, and everyone I know
does, as part of ordinary political energy. It is part of the necessary
imperfection of human commitment to justice, of the wonderfully passionate and
ordinary-and-extraordinary political energy Parker brings to his writing.
After writing the first draft of this essay, I went back to the fortieth
anniversary of my Catholic grade school, which had serviced mostly workingclass neighborhoods like mine. Most of my friends were from the two poorest
neighborhoods, and included a "public school" fellow whom I had known since
I was five, who had married a St. Rita's graduate. Although I had not seen him
in thirty-two years, he had been with me in mind and heart (and body-he broke
my collarbone through a gesture of rough-house affection when I was eleven)
all that time because he was for me a fundamental figure of integrity and
instinctual goodness. Whenever I was swamped by arguments about superior
education and refined sensibilities, I thought of him, and his natural leadership.
The other boys always wanted him to be a general (I was the sole female
combatant/tomboy in our neighborhood "army"); he mostly chose just to be a
sergeant. He made that male space safe for me and for the younger and weaker
boys; he did little commanding except to outlaw bullying. Through the process
of writing a dissertation on theories of social justice, navigating law school, and
then teaching, the most particular concrete grounding of my abstract arguments
for equality came in large part from him.
As I reflect, what was most stunning about meeting him now as an adult
was that the most fundamental level of connection on which we communicated
(even though he eventually, years "late," went to college, and has become a
remarkably articulate man) was, intensely and most tenuously, about God and
prayer. The issues of integrity and leadership values came with startling
suddenness to stuff that sounded like the preachings of St. Paul that I have been

17. Parker, supra note 1, at 582.
18. Id.
19. HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL
(1963).
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working with in this Quaker Study Center, Pendle Hill, this year. It might be
that re-connection with someone I had not seen since I was fourteen tapped an
extraordinary medium of translation-but that itself is the miracle of the ordinary
in God's loving creation, from my vantage. Much of what makes ordinary
people trustworthy for me is that most have a sense of the Golden Rule and the
Sermon on the Mount or the power of mitzvot or the God-claim of Islam.
Quakers call it that of God in every person. Such religious touchstones are not
talked about overtly all the time, but they are the carefully acknowledged
grounds for the faith that allows people to get out of bed in the morning, and
maybe even to participate in politics.
With all my intellectual pretensions in eighth grade at St. Rita's School, I
chose to go to the public high school and through years of eventual agnosticism.
I remember my rage at Sr. B. for asking me in front of the whole class to
justify not following my sister to the Catholic girls' high school. I never
dreamed that I would see her thirty-two years later, and know that in some
inchoate way I was, when she embraced and kissed me, deeply blessed beyond
words.
Such blessings, growing out of cramped school-yards, old
neighborhoods, and what one of my favorite "activist" priests whose ministry
is in inner-city Camden calls the "tribal ritual" of Mass, are the half-hidden
treasures of the ordinary person. Without them, Richard Parker would have no
one to join his vision of movement. With them, I hope he does-and perhaps
he will learn from their full ordinariness that which he may not disdain, but he
does not mention.
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